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1Introduction
Over the recent decades, labor market researchers have noticed two trends
which, if taken together, pose a challenge to conventional theorizing: Wage
dispersion grew signiﬁcantly, and over-qualiﬁcation increased as well. I
do not want to review these ﬁndings here, nor discuss the endemic data
problems. My intention is to just stipulate these trends and focus on the
implied theoretical issue.
While the joint occurrence of widening skill margins and over-
qualiﬁcation does not ﬁt well with the standard framework of wage
competition, it ﬂows rather naturally from a more institutional view of
labor market processes, which builds on Melvin Reder’s (1955) analysis and
will termed “Reder competition.”1
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews some empirical
ﬁndings concerning wage inequality and over-qualiﬁcation. Section 2 in-
troduces the concept of Reder competition. The subsequent Sections 3 to
4 present a very simple model of Reder competition in order to illustrate
the concept. The model is used in the remaining Sections 5 to 11 to trace
the joint occurrence of wage dispersion and over-qualiﬁcation to factors
such as labor heterogeneity, skill latitude, labor mobility, and non-labor
costs. It is urged that the evidence cited for skill biased technical change can
be interpreted to a great extent as evidence for an increasing importance
of labor heterogeneity, “heterogeneity-biased technological change,” so to
speak. Such technological change would induce the observed joint trends in
wage dispersion and over-education.
1 I use the term “Reder competition” for lack of a better label. In view if Stigler’s (1980) Law
of Eponymy ("No scientiﬁc discovery is named after its original discoverer" ), a non-eponymic
label would be preferable, but maybe this is a case where Stigler’s Law is refuted.
The argument presented in this paper is closely related to Skott’s (2006) theory that explains
the joint occurrence of over-qualiﬁcation and inequality in terms of discipline eYciency wages.
Let me add a slightly technical aside: While standard eYciency wage theory views excess supply
in a labor market as stabilizing the wage level in that market for given product prices, the
present note shows that such equilibration may be brought about by changes in the share of
labor costs in total production costs, as induced by wage changes
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Figure1:Wage dispersion in the US 1969-2001. (Data from Niku-
towski (2006, 18)).
1 Wage Dispersion and Over-Qualiﬁcation
In many western countries, a pronounced increase in wage dispersion has
been observed: Wages in the lower tiers of the wage distribution rose con-
siderably less than those in the upper rungs. This development is illustrated
in Figures 1 (for the US) and 2 (for Germany). During the same time, an
increase in “over-qualiﬁcation” or “over-education” has been observed in
many industrialized countries: An increasing number of workers hold jobs
that require considerably less qualiﬁcation than they have received. These
trends are illustrated in Figures 3 (for the US) and 4 (for Germany).
It is to be noted that the both trends materialized simultaneously in a
period when educational systems expanded dramatically, entailing a better
skilled workforce. With unchanging labor demand, standard theory would
have predicted wage inequality to diminish rather than increase. As a ratio-
nalization of this development, “skill biased technological change” has been
invoked. In the words of Acemoglu (2002, 2): “The recent consensus is
that technical change favors more skilled workers, replaces tasks previously
performed by the unskilled, and exacerbates inequality.” This explanation in
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Figure2:Wage dispersion in Germany 1984-2001. (Source: IAB, pre-
liminary).
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Figure3:Over-qualiﬁcation in the US. (Data from Vaisey (2006),
based on “objective” indicators.)
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Figure4: Over-qualiﬁcation male, 1979 (left column of each pair) and
1998/99 (right column of each pair) for diVerent skill and
age groups. (I: basic qualiﬁcation, II: professional qualiﬁca-
tion, III: university qualiﬁcation. Data from Laszlo (2002),
based on employees’ assessment.)
terms of increasing scarcity of advanced skills is not easily to reconcile, how-
ever, with “evidence that a substantial—and growing—number of American
workers are overqualiﬁed for their jobs,” and that “in 1979 one in four work-
ers thought that they could be replaced by less qualiﬁed workers, twenty
years later one in three workers held that opinion.”1 Seen from a conven-
tional perspective, this would suggest an increasing oversupply, rather than
a shortage of skills.2 Another interpretation is possible, however, and will be
outlined in the following sections.
2 Reder Competition
We consider labor markets that are characterized by the joint occurrence of
the following features:
 Workers are heterogeneous.
 Jobs exhibit skill latitude
1 Vaisey (2006, 855) and Laszlo (2002, 33, my translation), respectively. 2 Some researchers,
such as Green et al. (2002) ﬁnd no signiﬁcantly rising trend in over-qualiﬁcation, in spite
of education inﬂation, yet with increasing shortage of advanced skills the conventional view
would suggest a declining trend in over-qualiﬁcation.
5 Workers are imperfectly mobile.
 Firms pay job-speciﬁc wages.
 There is wage compression.
Workers are heterogeneous because they diVer in many economically relevant
attributes, like experience, trainability, skill, work attitudes, and preferences.
If labor were homogeneous and previous work experience did not matter,
any worker could easily be replaced by another one, and labor markets
would be akin to spot markets, with ﬁrms hiring the services of workers
for some days just as needed, rather than for prolonged periods, which is
characteristic for modern labor markets. Without heterogeneity, we would
observe neither long-term contracts, nor any screening of applicants, nor
training, and perhaps not even ﬁrms as we know them. In contrast, modern
labor markets are characterized by heterogeneity of labor.
We shall assume also that the jobs under discussion exhibit skill latitude
in the sense that the productivity of a job depends on the skill of the worker
doing this job, rather than being independent of the worker’s performance
as long as some minimum skill requirements are met. A job on a production
line would exhibit little latitude, while the job of a sales representative would
oVer much skill latitude in the sense that diVerent workers may work in such
a job with quite diVerent success. If there is skill latitude, labor heterogeneity
matters, as diVerent workers can do the same job, but cannot do it equally
well.1
Further, workers are imperfectly mobile because they cannot move cost-
lessly from one location to another, or are not willing to do so unless wage
diVerentials are glaring. With perfect mobility, perfect sorting of workers
would be conceivable, even in presence of labor heterogeneity and skill
1 Smith (1904, v.i.178) drew already attention to the eVect of technical progress on skill latitude
whendiscussingtheconsequencesoftheintroductionofﬁrearms. Heconjecturedthattechnical
progress would diminish skill latitude, whereas the position taken in this paper amounts to the
thesis that technical progress enlarges skill latitude, more in line with Marshall (1920, iv.ix.9).
But regardless of which thesis will ultimately turn out to be correct, it is of interest to analyze
the eVect of changes in skill latitude on wage formation. This note seeks to contribute to this
question.
6latitude, but this is not what we observe. Because there is imperfect mobility,
heterogeneity and skill latitude are economically important.
Job-speciﬁc wages refer to wages that are ﬁxed according to a wage-setting
policy, rather than by individual bargaining. Examples for job-speciﬁc pay
would be a pure time rate paid to all workers performing a certain job, or a
piece rate, or a seniority system, or an incentive system like the Taylor plan
or the Halsey 50-50 plan.1
Wage compression refers to the empirical regularity that ﬁrms, given their
wage policies, prefer better workers to poorer workers for any given job. This
implies that more productive workers are relatively underpaid, compared to
less productive workers holding the same job.2
Withlaborheterogeneityandskilllatitude, thesamejobcanbeperformed
by workers with diVerent ability, albeit with diVerent perfection, and any
worker meeting some minimum requirements is, in principle, employable.
Firmsveryobviouslydistinguishbetween“good”and“bad”employees. This
is a clear indication that labor heterogeneity and skill latitude are actually
encountered in most ﬁrms.
When looking for workers, ﬁrms face a heterogeneous labor supply. They
prefer the best applicants and thus face a trade-oV between the wage they
oVer and the quality of workers they can hire: The better the wage oVer,
1 For actual wage-setting practices, see any textbook on compensation, such as Milkovich
and Newman (1999). 2 Frazis and Loewenstein (2006, 3) ﬁnd that “only 32 percent of
diVerences in starting productivity are reﬂected in diVerences in starting wages,” and that
“productivity growth of 10 percent results in wage growth of only 2.9 per cent. See also Frank
(1984), Bishop (1987), and Bewley (1999, 85). Further, the studies by Bishop and by Franzis
and Loewenstein are merely concerned with the relationship between wages and “productivity”
in a quite narrow sense: Employers have rated workers on a “productivity scale of zero to
one hundred, where one hundred equals the maximum productivity any of your employees
can attain and zero is absolutely no productivity.” Wage compression, in their sense, refers
to the wage ratios being below the productivity ratios, determined this way. Even if the
authors would have found that there is no wage compression in their sense, there would
be very substantial wage compression in the Marshallian sense, which is the relevant sense
in our context. Marshall (1920, vi.iii.13) pointed this out as follows: “The corrected law
then stands that the tendency of economic freedom and enterprise is generally to equalize
eYciency-earnings in the same district: but where much expensive ﬁxed capital is used, it
would be to the advantage of the employer to raise the time-earnings of the more eYcient
workers more than in proportion to their eYciency.”
The Appendix provides some further theoretical discussion relating to wage compression.
7the more applicants will be available, and the more demanding can be
the hiring standard implemented, entailing a more productive work force.
The wage rate and the hiring standard must be conceived as determined
simultaneously by the ﬁrms’ optimizing against the trade-oV between the
wage level and the hiring standard.
In order to ﬁx ideas, we may conceive two extreme forms of labor market
clearing:
 Wage competition: For a given hiring standard, the market may be
cleared by adjusting the wage rate
 Jobcompetition: Foragivenwagerate,thelabormarketmaybecleared
by adjusting the hiring standard.
The view of wage competition–viz. treating labor markets in analogy to
product markets–dominates contemporary labor market analysis. The other
extreme, job competition, has been used by a minority of labor economists,
following Lester Thurow (1975). Both views are incomplete. Labor markets
characterized by skill latitude are best analyzed in terms of a combination of
both extremes: Wages oVers and hiring standards are determined simulta-
neously in response to market conditions. This is the type of labor market
competition Reder (1955) has envisaged, and will be labeled accordingly:
 Reder competition: Labor markets are cleared by simultaneous adjust-
ments of wages and hiring standards (and possibly other parameters).
Reder competition can not usefully be analyzed, however, by simply combin-
ing the views of wage competition and job competition, viz. by ﬁrst treating
the hiring standard as given and analyze wage formation, and then take
wages as given and consider the adjustment of hiring standards. Such ceteris
paribus treatment would fade out the interdependence of both mechanisms,
and that wages are ﬁxed in order to implement a hiring standard, and hiring
8standards require a corresponding wage policy.1 The following analysis
focuses on the interdependence of hiring standards and wage setting.2
3 Selection Wages
Inpresenceoflaborheterogeneityinconjunctionwithskilllatitude,diVerent
workers can perform a given job with diVerent productivity while their pay
does not reﬂect productivity diVerentials fully. This setting induces ﬁrms
to oVer wages in order to control the productivity of their work force. The
market wages that arise from the interaction of ﬁrms engaging in this kind
of wage setting are termed “selection wages.” This section illustrates the idea
in a simple case.3
To capture labor heterogeneity and skill latitude, we consider just two
grades of labor, proliﬁc and mediocre. Both types of workers, the mediocre
and the proliﬁc, can perform the task under consideration, but with dif-
ferent eYciency: The proliﬁc workers are more productive. Firms can
distinguish the types costlessly when they hire them. Further we assume
that the alternative employment for both types of workers is such that in-
dividual productivity diVerences do not matter—think of a conveyor belt.
Their wage in this standardized employment functions as a reservation wage
(alternative wage) for the labor market under consideration. It is denoted
by R.4
1 See Schlicht (1985, Ch. 2) for a pertinent methodological discussion. 2 The interdepen-
dency between wages and hiring standards is also in voked more recently by Mortensen (1970).
Note that Reder (1964) has augmented the wage/hiring standard trade-oV described in Reder
(1955) by adding a further parameter, the vacancy rate, to the analysis, but this line of argument
is not pursued here and in the following for reasons of simplicity. 3 Selection wages are a
variety of eYciency wages, see Schlicht (1978, 2005). They are closely akin to self-selection
wages studied by Weiss (1980), but do not presuppose asymmetry of information. 4 This
assumption can easily be relaxed in the sense that we may allow diVerent reservation wages for
both types of workers, as any equilibrium wage exceeding R will turn out to be independent of
R.
9To capture wage compression, we assume ﬁrst that ﬁrms pay the same
wage to mediocre and proliﬁc workers.5
While ﬁrms prefer to employ only proliﬁc workers, not enough of them
are available to produce the output demanded. Hence ﬁrms have to hire also
mediocre workers. Firms can, however, increase the number of applicants—
and also in particular of proliﬁc applicants—by oVering a wage above the
going market rate. This would enable them to increase the share of proliﬁc
workers in their work force and and enjoy higher productivity, but at the
expense of higher labor costs.
We will assume here that all workers performing the job under considera-
tion receive the same wage, regardless of their productivity. This captures,
in the simplest form, the idea that wage diVerentials do not reﬂect produc-
tivity diVerentials fully—they don’t reﬂect them at all. At the same time,
the assumption captures the empirically relevant case of a wage without a
performance component.1
Consider, thus, an industry composed of a number of identical ﬁrms that
operate under free entry and produce a certain good. Firm size is ﬁxed in
the sense that each ﬁrm can employ just n workers, regardless of whether
they are mediocre or proliﬁc.
The proliﬁc workers have productivity x, and the mediocre workers have
productivity y < x. Denote by q the fraction of proliﬁc workers and by the
remainder (1   q) the fraction of mediocre workers in the work force. We
shall refer to q as the quality mix of the workforce. As ﬁrms can assess the
productivity of the applicants, they will hire all proliﬁc workers who apply
and ﬁll the remaining job openings with mediocre applicants.2
Given the fraction of proliﬁc workers q in the market with productivity
5 Note that this not uncommon practice: In Bishop’s (1987, S42) sample, 56 percent of the
plant workers and 14 percent of the oYce workers received performance-unrelated pay. In the
appendix it is shown that the eVects that will be derived under the ﬂat-pay assumption will
remain valid for performance pay as long as wage compression obtains. 1 For some further
observations, see the appendix on wage compression below. 2 As there is no continuum
of diVerent workers with diVerent productivity, ﬁrms cannot impose a hiring standard in
this extremely simple setting, but the fundamental selection wage mechanism still applies:
By increasing the wage oVer, ﬁrms can attain a higher productivity of their work force, as
they attracting more proliﬁc workers. For an analysis of the continuous case and the market
determination of hiring standards, see Schlicht (2005).
10x and the fraction of mediocre workers (1   q) with productivity y < x,
average productivity of the work force under consideration is
a = q  x + (1   q)  y: (1)
The average productivity of a ﬁrm’s work force may deviate from average
market productivity a if the share of proliﬁc workers in a ﬁrm diVers from
the market average. Denote the share of proliﬁc workers enjoyed by the ﬁrm
under consideration by . The entailed productivity of the ﬁrm’s work force
is
 =   x + (1   )  y
= (x   y) + y: (2)
The share of proliﬁc workers in the ﬁrm’s workforce  will depend in turn
on the wage oVer w the ﬁrm makes, as compared to the going market wage
rate W. If the ﬁrm pays above the market wage (w > W), it will attract
more proliﬁc applicants and need hire only fewer mediocre workers. If
the ﬁrm oVers a wage below the market wage (w < W), it will ﬁnd fewer
proliﬁc applicants and has to hire more mediocre workers. This idea can be
expressed by
 = q 

1 +   log
 w
W

(3)
where the constant 1 >  > 0 parametrizes mobility. It gives the elasticity
of qualiﬁcation for a typical ﬁrm in response to its wage oVer:1
 =
@
@w

w

 


w=W
:
Equations (2) and (3) imply
 = q 

1 +   log
 w
W

 (x   y) + y: (4)
1 We exclude   1 because it would be always optimal to pay maximum wages in this case,
and the selection eVect would not apply in any interesting way. The formulation (3) is selected
for reasons of simplicity of exposition. A more general formulation such as  = q  f
 
w
W

with f (1) = 1, f0 > 0, and f00 < 0 would not change the argument or the results.
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Figure5: The share of proliﬁc workers in a typical ﬁrm as a function
of the wage oVer w. If the wage oVer is equal to the market
wage (w = W) , the share of proliﬁc workers in the ﬁrm
will be equal to the market share ( = q).
The industry is composed of a number of ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm has to invest
in establishing a workshop for n workers. The capital outlays induce capital
user costs (including normal proﬁts) of C. With productivity , a ﬁrm’s
production will be  n. For a product price p, sales returns will be p n.
With a wage rate w, the ﬁrm incurs labor costs w  n. Further, it has to
cover capital user costs C. The ﬁrm’s proﬁts will thus be equal to  =
p    n   w  n   C.1
For the subsequent argument it is convenient to express proﬁts of the
typical ﬁrm in per-capita terms. Denoting per-capita capital user costs by
c = 1
nC, these per-capita proﬁts are given by
 = p     w   c
1 For simplicity, other non-labor costs are neglected here. This simpliﬁcation does not aVect
the argument nor the results. In order to take outlays for variable inputs into account, interpret
p as the market price of the product minus the outlays for other factors of production per piece.
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Figure6:The zero proﬁt curve (a) gives all (W;p)-combinations
where the zero-proﬁt condition (6) is satisﬁed. The selec-
tion wage curve (b) gives all (W;p)-combinations where
condition (9) is met.The parameters used are x = 1; y =
:5; q = :5; c = 10,  = :5 and R = 1.
The parameters used are x = 1; y = :5; q = :5; c = 10,
 = :5 and R = 1.
= p 

q 

1 +   log
 w
W

 (x   y) + y

  w   c: (5)
Consider now market equilibrium. As all ﬁrms are alike, all ﬁrms will
pay the same wage rate w which can be identiﬁed with the market wage rate
W: Equilibrium requires two things: First, per-capita proﬁts must be zero.
Otherwise there would be market entry or market exit, changing conditions
of supply and demand. Second, it must be optimal for each ﬁrm to set its
wage rate w equal to the market wage rate W. Else the market wage rate
would change.
The zero-proﬁt condition at w = W is equivalent to
p =
W + c
q  (x   y) + y
: (6)
This condition is depicted as the “zero proﬁt” curve in Figure 6(a). Above
that curve, there are positive proﬁts that induce market entry and reduce the
price level, below there will be losses and market exit, driving the product
13price up.1 As the minimum market wage is given by the reservation wage
R, the zero proﬁt curve is of relevance only for wage levels exceeding the
reservation wage.
The conditions for a proﬁt maximum with respect to w are
@
@w
= p  q    (x   y)
1
w
  1 = 0 (7)
@2
@w2 =  p  q    (x   y)
1
w2 < 0: (8)
As the second-order condition (8) is always satisﬁed, the ﬁrst-order con-
dition (7) guarantees a proﬁt maximum (if a maximum exists at all). At
w = W, equation (7) implies
p =
W
q    (x   y)
: (9)
We denote this equation as the “selection wage equation.” Its graphical
representation is termed the selection wage curve and is depicted in Figure
6(b). The selection wage curve gives, for any wage level W, that price level
that makes it optimal for the individual ﬁrm to set its wage w just equal to
to market wage W. Above this curve, the derivative @
@w in (7) is positive at
w = W. The typical ﬁrm will therefore set its wage above the market wage
(w > W). This will drive the market wage up. Below this curve, we will
have @
@w < 0 at w = W, and the typical ﬁrm will set w < W. This will
drive the market wage down.1
The crossing of the two curves gives the equilibrium combination of the
wage level and the product price. Algebraically equations (6) and (9) can be
solved for the equilibrium market wage rate and the equilibrium price. The
1 If there is market entry, this will not only increase production, but also employment. This
increase comes about through the employment of mediocre workers (as all proliﬁc workers are
already employed). This will reduce q and thereby shift the zero-proﬁt curve up. This eVect
would not aVect our conclusions but is neglected here in order to keep the argument simple.
1 The selection wage is a special case of what Stiglitz (1973, 290) hast termed an “eYciency
wage.” This modern usage of the term “eYciency wage” refers to the wage rate, set by the ﬁrm,
that minimizes the Marshallian eYciency-wage.
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Figure7:(a) Market equilibrium is obtained where the zero proﬁt
curveandtheselectionwagecurvecross. Thephasediagram
(b) indicates stability. (Parameter values as in Figure 6.
Equilibrium is at W = 2 and p = 16.)
equilibrium wage rate—which will be called the “selection wage”—is
 W =
q (x   y)
q (x   y)(1   ) + y
 c (10)
and the corresponding equilibrium price is
 p =
c
q (x   y)(1   ) + y
: (11)
The equilibrium will be feasible only if the equilibrium wage  W exceeds the
reservation wage R of the workers. Otherwise the ﬁrms have to maximize
their proﬁts (5) under the additional constraint w  R, and would set
w = R, entailing a market wage level W = R as would be expected
with wage competition. The case of interest here (and where the wage
competition mechanism is not applicable) relates to the reservation wage
being the selection wage. If this is the case, changes in the reservation wage
would not aVect the equilibrium wage (which is the selection wage) and the
equilibrium price level. This is an obvious deviation from the results that
would be obtained from a model of wage competition.
154 Stability
The phase diagram given in Figure 7 indicates stability. Another way to
see this is the following. Assume that the prevailing wage level W initially
diVers from the equilibrium wage level  W. By combining (6) and (7), we
obtain the proﬁt-maximizing wage level w for the typical ﬁrm as
w =
(x   y)q
(x   y)q + y
(W + c)
which implies together with (6) and (10)
w   W =  
(1   )(x   y)q + y
(x   y)q + y
 
W    W

: (12)
If the wage level is above the equilibrium wage level (W >  W), each ﬁrm
will set its wage w below the market wage level W. This drives the market
wage level down until the equilibrium wage level is reached. Conversely, for
W <  W the ﬁrms set w > W. This drives the wage level up to  W: This
establishes stability of adjustment. The graph of equation (12) is depicted in
Figure and the direction of adjustment is indicated.1
Further, the equilibrium would be unstable if the wage rate exceeded the
marginal value product of a mediocre worker. If this were the case it would
be proﬁtable for any ﬁrm to leave all jobs unmanned that cannot be ﬁlled
with proliﬁc workers. This condition is p  x > W. Together with (10) and
(11) it can be equivalently stated as
x >
q
1   q
or q <
x
1 + x
: (13)
If the productivity x of the mediocre workers is too low, it would not be
worthwhile to employ them. If mobility is high, the equilibrium wage level
1 A formal analysis would proceed as follows. Denote denote the zero proﬁt curve by
p = a + bW and the selection wage curve by p = c + dW with a > c and b < d.
The diVerential equation system _ p = (a + bW   p), _ W = 
 
p c
d   W

describes, for
some positive speed parameters  and , the adjustment described in the text. Its Jacobian 
  b

d  

has a negative trace and a positive determinant. This establishes stability.
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Figure8:If the market wage W is above the equilibrium wage  W;
the typical ﬁrm will set its wage oVer w below the market
wage W (point A). This drives the market wage down. Con-
versely, W <  W induces w > W , and this drives the mar-
ketwageupuntilequilibriumisreachedandw = W =  W
obtains. (Parameters as in Figure 6.)
 W would be high, and mediocre workers were too expensive to employ. The
same would hold true if the ratio of proliﬁc workers in the work force were
too high.1
5 Increasing Heterogeneity and Latitude
Consider an increase of worker heterogeneity and skill latitude, in the sense
that the productivity diVerential between proliﬁc and mediocre workers in-
creaseswhileaveragelaborproductivityremainsconstant. Wemayformalize
thisbyintroducingaheterogeneityparameterhsuchthatanincreaseinhin-
creases the diVerence (x   y) but leaves average productivity qx+(1   q)y
unchanged. If we write the productivities x and y as functions of h, these
1 Condition (13) is satisﬁed for the parameter values given in Figure 6. This establishes the
possibility of such solutions.
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Figure9:An increase in heterogeneity reduces the slope of the se-
lection wage curve while leaving the zero-proﬁt condition
unaVected. As a result, the equilibrium wage level and the
equilibrium price level increase. (Parameters as in Figure
6, with x increased from 1 to 1:1 and y decreased from :5
to :4. The equilibrium wage level increases from 2 to 3 and
the equilibrium price increases from 16 to 17:4 .)
functions must satisfy q  x0 (h) + (1   q)  y0 (h) = 0 and we can stipulate
x0 > 0; y0 =  
q
1   q
x0 < 0:
An increase in heterogeneity h means that the productivity of the proliﬁc
workers increases and the productivity of the mediocre workers decreases
while average productivity remains unaVected.
As average productivity remains unaVected, the zero-proﬁt constraint (6)
is not changed. Yet increasing heterogeneity enlarges the diVerence (x   y).
This decreases the slope of the selection wage curve. As a consequence, the
equilibrium wage rate and the equilibrium price level increase (Figure 9).
The intuition for this result is that the selection wage aspect of wage
setting becomes more important if heterogeneity increases. This induces
ﬁrms to raise the wage level. In the aggregate this raises costs and prices.
186 Changes in the Quality Mix
Another aspect of wage formation is captured by the proportion q of proliﬁc
workersintheworkforce. ConsidertheeVectofanincreaseinthenumberof
proliﬁc workers in the work force, viz. an increase in q. Such a change aVects
boththezero-proﬁtline(6)andtheselectionwagecurve(9). Thezero-proﬁt
line will shift down, because an increase in the number of proliﬁc workers
increases productivity and reduces, for any given wage level, production
costs per unit of output. At the same time, an increase in q will ﬂatten the
selection wage curve which would, by itself, induce a higher wage rate. The
underlying mechanism is that, with an increase in the wage oVer, a ﬁrm
attracts more applicants. If the fraction of proliﬁc workers amongst these
applicants increases, a wage increase becomes even more eVective as an
instrument, as more proliﬁc workers are around than can be attracted this
way.
The joint outcome of both eVects can be evaluated by again taking the
appropriate derivatives of equations (10) and (11). We obtain
@  W
@q
= 2c(x   y)y > 0 (14)
@ p
@q
=  2c((x   y)(1   )) < 0 (15)
with  = 1
(x y)(1 )+y. It can be seen that the selection wage eVect pushes
the wage level up, while the increased average productivity of labor abates
costs and prices, overcompensating the cost increases brought about by the
wage increase. Wages go up and prices go down. With the parameter values
of Figure 6, an increase q from q = :5 to q = :6 increases the wage rate from
W = 2 to W = 2:3 and decreases the price from p = 16 to p = 15:4.
7 Trends in Heterogeneity and Latitude
A closer look at the studies dealing with skill-biased technical change reveal
that skill requirements have changed in all kinds of jobs, not just in the well-
paying jobs. Autor et al. (2003, 1279, 1281) have noted: “The substitution
19away from routine and toward nonroutine labor input was not primarily
accountedforbyeducationalupgrading; rather,taskshiftsarepervasiveatall
educational levels.” In a similar vein, Spitz-Oener (2006, 237) has observed:
“There has been a sharp increase in nonroutine cognitive tasks, such as
doing research, planning, or selling, and a pronounced decline in manual
and cognitive routine tasks, such as doubleentry bookkeeping and machine
feeding. ... most of the task changes have occurred within occupations.”
This suggests an increase of skill latitude. At the same time, the expansion
of the educational systems has increased the number of educated workers,
and it can be expected that the enlarging of the pool of educated workers
has increased heterogeneity.
By the above argument, the increases in latitude, heterogeneity, and the
quality mix will make it more proﬁtable for ﬁrms to increase their wage
oVers in order to attract the more productive workers. At the market level,
this will lead to higher wages, making education even more attractive. The
eVect may be strengthened by an improved quality mix.
8 Education and Over-Qualiﬁcation
Consider the case that the jobs under consideration require some previous
training, irrespectively whether the worker is proliﬁc or mediocre. The
higher the wage rate W, the higher will be the supply of trained workers,
bothproliﬁcandmediocre. Firmswillpreferentiallyhiretheproliﬁcworkers
and ﬁll the remaining vacancies with mediocre workers. If more workers
train than are needed to ﬁll all vacancies, we have over-qualiﬁcation.
Workers who consider training will face a lottery: They will turn out
proliﬁc or mediocre, with certain probabilities, but don’t know their future
type in advance. If a trained worker has turned out to be proliﬁc, he will be
hired at wage W with certainty, but, if mediocre, only with a certain prob-
ability that decreases with increasing over-education. With an increasing
wage rate we would thus expect more training. This improves the quality
mix. The improvement in the quality mix induces even higher wages and
expanded training, along with increased over-qualiﬁcation. In this sense,
the joint occurrence of increasing wage inequality and over-education is
20brought about by Reder competition. The view ﬁts well with the empiri-
cal observation that the increase in inequality seems to have been caused
“predominantly by increasing wage dispersion within industries, rather than
between industries” (Wheeler, 2005, 375), while the standard view—that
advanced skills became relatively scarce, while the demand for basic skills
decreased—would not ﬁt in this respect. The suggested interpretation in
terms of increasing heterogeneity and skill latitude ﬁts also well with the
ﬁnding that the less able within an educational group do not ﬁnd adequate
employment and have to take jobs where their qualiﬁcation is partially
redundant (Green and McIntosh, 2002). Further, some authors have ob-
served an increased wage premium from education and took this as “prima
facie evidenceagainsttherebeinganyover-investmentineducation”(Green
et al., 2002, 798). The above argument shows that such a conclusion may
be doubted, as over-education may indeed be induced by increased wage
premia for education.
9 Wage Dispersion
It has been shown so far that wage level W for the jobs under consideration
increases if such factors as labor heterogeneity or job latitude increase. This
implies that the wage diVerential W  R increases, and in this sense we have
an increase in wage dispersion for any given reservation wage R.
Yet the level of equilibrium selection wages W itself is determined inde-
pendently of the reservation wage R —see equation (10) or Figure 7. The
wage structure that emerges in an economy characterized by selection wages
will be determined by the factors discussed so far: The importance of labor
heterogeneity and skill latitude for the various jobs. We would expect, thus,
that technological change that renders labor heterogeneity and skill latitude
more important will increase all related wages, but we cannot predict the
extent to which a particular rung in the wage distribution is aVected by such
changes. It could be the case, for instance, that the ratio of medium to low
wages increases, stays constant, or decreases in response to such change,
depending on the whether the selection eVect becomes relatively more or
less pronounced in one range, as compared to the other. Empiricqally, these
21developments diVer across countries. From Figures 1 and 2 it can be seen,
for instance, that the ratio of medium wages to low wages in the US has
remained constant beteen 1990 to 2000, while it increased substantially in
Germany. It seems to be an advantage of the Reder view to allow for such
diVerences, but it remains an open empirical question whether these diVer-
ences between countries can actually be traced to diVerences in the factors
that give rise to selection wages.
Further, the separation between reservation wages and selection wages
becomes blurred if we consider not just one single labor market, but the en-
tire spectrum of jobs. For any given job it remains true that the equilibrium
wage will be the minimum of the selection wage and the reservation wage.
Yet the reservation wage pertaining to a particular job—the wage paid for
work in the next best alternative—may be determined as a selection wage in
that alternative. Consider, as an example, a bus driver who is required to
drive a bus according to a schedule. Any driver meeting the hiring standard
will perform equally well in such a job. An alternative employment for the
bus drivers could be to work as truck drivers, where less formal qualiﬁcation
is required. For truck drivers, skill diVerences would matter in the sense
that, absent a strict schedule, drivers may diVer in their ability to ﬁgure out
appropriate routes, or clever sequences of delivery. If ﬁrms pay selection
wages to truck drivers, these wages would function as reservation wages
for bus drivers. An increase in skill latitude for truck drivers would then
push up wages for bus drivers, although these wages are not selection wages.
Hence the selection mechanism may aVect wages indirectly, even in jobs
without skill latitude.
10 Increasing Mobility
The selection wage mechanism that brings about wage dispersion and over-
qualiﬁcation has been described here as propelled by increasing hetero-
geneity and skill latitude. Other processes may produce the same result,
however. To illustrate such a further mechanism, consider an increase in
labor mobility. A conventional preconception would be that increase in the
mobility of the workers—in the sense of a greater responsiveness to wage
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Figure10:An increase in mobility reduces the slope of the selection
wage curve while leaving the zero-proﬁt condition unaf-
fected. As a result, the equilibrium wage level and the
equilibrium price level increase. (Parameters as in Figure 6,
and  increased from :5 to :7 The equilibrium wage level
increases from 2to 3and the equilibrium prince increases
from 16to 17:4 .)
diVerentials—will render the labor market “more competitive,” thereby im-
proving eYciency and decreasing production costs. This would lead in turn
to reduced product prices. As will be seen presently, the outcome in the
model discussed so far amounts to the opposite.1
Mobility is parametrized by . An increase in  reduces the slope of the
selection wage equation (9) in the (W;p) plane but leaves the zero-proﬁt
condition (6) unchanged. Hence both the wage level and the price level
increase (Figure 10).
The intuition for this result is simple: With increased mobility, wage
increases become more eVective as a means for attracting proliﬁc workers.
This induces ﬁrms to raise their wages. For the industry as a whole, this
1 See also Schlicht (1978, 346) for a similar argument in the context of turnover wages.
23increases costs and therefore the price of the product. We obtain wage
increases and price increases in response to an increase in mobility.
11 Fixed Non-Labor Costs
Still another mechanism leading to a similar outcome relates to an increase
in ﬁxed non-labor costs, such as capital costs.1 An increase such costs can be
captured by an increase in c. This shifts the zero-proﬁt line (6) up and leaves
the selection wage equation (9) unaVected. Hence both the equilibrium
wage and the equilibrium price will move up (Figure 11).
The intuition is straightforward again: If more capital is used, the product
price increases. More productive workers produce more with the same
equipment, and any productivity advantage becomes more valuable. As
a consequence, productivity diVerentials among workers become more
important to the ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm will have an incentive to oVer higher
wages in order to attract more proliﬁc workers. As all ﬁrms behave in
this manner, the wage level is pushed up. The subsequent process is as
described above for the case of labor heterogeneity: Education becomes
more attractive, and over-qualiﬁcation increases.
12 Conclusion
Reder competition emphasizes that ﬁrms oVer wages to improve the quality
of their work force. If a ﬁrm oVers a higher wage, it has more applicants to
select from, and will end up with better workers. Thus ﬁrms face a trade-oV
between wages and productivity. This induces them to set selection wages
that balance the costs and beneﬁts of oVering higher wages.
1 Variable non-labor costs are not relevant for the present argument. They can be easily
introduced into the argument by re-interpreting the product price. Denote by m the variable
costs occurring unit. From the point of view of the ﬁrm it is equivalent whether to obtain
a price of p with variable cost of zero, or a price of (p + m) with variable costs m. Hence
substituting p by (p   m) in all previous formulae would suYce to take care of such variable
costs. All our results would therefore be maintained. A change in variable costs would simply
lead to a corresponding change in the product price while leaving the wage level unaVected.
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Figure11:An increase in capital intensity raises the zero proﬁt line
while leaving the selection wage line unaVected. As a result,
the equilibrium wage level and the equilibrium price level
increase. (Parameters as in Figure 6, and c increased from
10 to 14 The equilibrium wage level increases from 2to
2:8; and the equilibrium prince increases from 16 to 22:4
.)
Factors that render diVerences between workers more important induce
ﬁrms to place more emphasis on selection and to increase wages. Such fac-
tors are labor heterogeneity, skill latitude, or labor mobility. All these factors
would give rise to the joint occurrence of inequality and over-qualiﬁcation.
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Appendix
Performance Pay
The argument has been presented under the (empirically relevant) assump-
tion of ﬂat pay: All workers receive the same pay, regardless of performance.
This makes the proliﬁc workers more desirable and induces selection eVects.
It should be intuitively clear that similar results obtain in case of perfor-
mance pay, as long as there is wage compression. If the additional proﬁt
obtainable from replacing a mediocre worker by a proliﬁc one exceeds the
additionwagepayments, itwillbeworthwhiletoattractthemoreproductive
workers. The purpose of the following remarks is to establish this formally
for the case of pure performance pay, where ﬁrms set a piece rate that is
applied to proliﬁc and mediocre workers alike. (This is an extreme assump-
tion. Empirically, wage compression seems to be somewhere between ﬂat
pay and pure performance pay.)
Denote wage payments for the proliﬁc workers by w and wage payments
for the mediocre workers by v. With a piece rate, the ratio of these wage
payments would correspond to the ratio of the productivities x and y and
we have w
v = x
y implying v = w
y
x. The proﬁt equation (5) would read
under this assumption
 = p  (x + (1   )y)   w   (1   )v   c (16)
28=  

p(x   y) + w

x
y
  1

+ py   w
x
y
  c (17)
Repeating the analysis of Section 3 with (5) replaced by (17) yields the
equilibrium wage
~ W =
qx(x   y)
(qx + (1   q)y)
2  c: (18)
As compared to the previous result (10) that has been derived under the ﬂat
pay assumption, the wage rate (17) emerging with performance pay reacts
similar to parameter changes: Increases in mobility  and the quality mix
q increase the wage level. Further the wage level increases if the productiv-
ity diVerence (x   y) increases while average productivity qx + (1   q)y
remains unaVected, i.e. if heterogeneity increases. Thus allowing for perfor-
mance pay—even in the extreme form of a pure piece rate—yields results
similar to those obtained under the ﬂat pay assumption. Comparing the
equilibrium wage rates (10) and (18) shows further that the equilibrium
wage for the proliﬁc workers obtainable under performance pay ~ W exceeds
the equilibrium wage rate in the case of ﬂat pay  W. It appears, thus, that the
introduction of performance pay increases wage dispersion. Yet the selection
wage eVect is maintained, as the equilibrium wage for the mediocre workers,
which is ~ V =
y
x ~ W is independent of the reservation wage R. If heterogene-
ity and skill latitude are suYciently important, it will exceed the reservation
wage, while wage competition would predict a mediocre wage V = R.
Wage Compression
Selection wages arise from wage compression. The assumption is essential
for any model of selection wages. Wage compression is typically linked
to psychological factors like fairness considerations, or to concerns about
relative income positions among the workers. The purpose of the following
remarks is to point out that we should expect wage compression to emerge
even in absence of these psychological factors, simply as a consequence of
limited mobility. I hasten to add that this argument does not imply that the
psychological factors are less important than the more narrowly conceived
29economic factors to be discussed presently. The psychological factors may
well be dominant.
Consider market wage rates W and V for the two types of workers, the
proliﬁc and the mediocre. The proliﬁc workers have productivity x and the
mediocre workers have productivity y < x. Given any proliﬁc wage W we
ask now which mediocre wage would make a ﬁrm indiVerent between hiring
a proliﬁc or a mediocre worker. This wage is the Marshallian eYciency wage
for the mediocre workers, denoted by VM.1 It can be calculated as follows.
With a product price p, the diVerence in value added between a proliﬁc and
a mediocre worker is p(x   y). Hence the ﬁrm would be just indiVerent
between hiring a mediocre or a proliﬁc worker if the wage for the mediocre
worker is VMand the condition
W   VM = p(x   y) (19)
is satisﬁed. Any wage structure with (W;V ) = (W;VM) would exhibit zero
wage compression as the ﬁrms would be indiVerent between hiring a proliﬁc
or a mediocre worker.
Assume such a market equilibrium without wage compression. A ﬁrm
may now consider deviating from market wages by setting diVerent wages
(w;v). It considers, in particular, to reduce the wage rate for the proliﬁc
workers below the market wage rate. If supply of the mediocre workers at
the wage rate VM is perfectly elastic (the assumption used in the body of
the paper), it will always be worthwhile to do so, because a slight reduction
of W will reduce the share of proliﬁc workers somewhat, but these can be
replaced by mediocre workers without aVecting proﬁts. (VM is deﬁned by
this property.) The wage costs incurred for the remaining proliﬁc workers
will, however be reduced, and a reduction in the wage rate for the proliﬁc
workers w below the market rate W will increase proﬁts. Hence the wage
structure(W;VM)cannotpersist. Firmswilldrivedownproliﬁcwages,with
the result that alternative oVers for the proliﬁc workers decline. Under the
assumption of perfectly elastic mediocre supply, any stable wage structure
must, therefore, exhibit wage compression.
1 See Marshall (1920, vi,ii,9). Note that the Marshallian notion of an eYciency wage diVers
from the modern usage.
30Yet the assumption of perfectly elastic mediocre supply is unnecessary
restrictive. If the ﬁrm reduces proliﬁc wages, it may be necessary to increase
mediocre wages in order to attract some additional mediocre workers as
replacements for proliﬁc workers who are lost, because of the reduced wage
oVer. Take the simple case that supply elasticities of mediocre and proliﬁc
workers are identical, denoted again by . Supply of proliﬁc workers , as a
share of the typical ﬁrm’s total employment, is given by
 = q 

1 +   log
 w
W

(20)
where q denotes again the quality mix prevailing in the market. This is
identical to (3). Making a similar assumption for the supply of the mediocre
workers  amounts to
 = (1   q) 

1 +   log
 v
V

: (21)
The typical ﬁrm’s proﬁts can be written as
 = px + py   w   v   c:
The ﬁrm will maximize this expression under the constraints (20) and (21)
and under the further constraint that all jobs must be manned which reads
 +  = 1. This gives rise to the Lagrangian
L = q 

1 +   log
 w
W

(px   w) +
+(1   q) 

1 +   log
 v
V

(py   v)   c +
 

q log
 w
W

+ (1   q)log
 v
V

with the derivatives at
@L
@w
=
q
w
((px   w)      w)
@L
@v
=
1   q
v
((py   v)      v):
31Putting these derivatives to zero and assuming equilibrium with (w;v) =
(W;V ) implies the wage diVerential
W   V = (p(x   y)   (W   V ))
and hence
W   V =

1 + 
p(x   y):
This diVerential is smaller than the wage Marshallian diVerential (19) that
deﬁnes the absence of wage compression. Hence even in case that all types
of workers are equally mobile, wage compression would result.
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